

# ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 22/WG 23 N 0327

Additional meeting #17 markup of Proposed vulnerability descriptions YUK and SUK

**Date** March 25, 2011  
**Contributed by** Secretary  
**Original file name**  
**Notes** Replaces N0324

I wrote up two vulnerabilites instead of one.

The first one deals with the suppression of runtime checks (as I was tasked to do).

The second one deals with the de-facto suppression of compile-time checks and with inherently unsafe operations that the language might provide.

I simply could not find a good way of combining all three in a single vulnerability, although they are of the same general ilk. All attempts ended in complexity of description.

## Suppression of Language-Defined Run-Time Checking (YUK)

Description of application vulnerability

Some languages include the provision for runtime checking to prevent vulnerabilities to arise. Canonical examples are bounds or length checks on array operations or null-value checks upon dereferencing pointers or references. In most cases, the reaction to a failed check is the raising of a language-defined exception.

As run-time checking requires execution time and as some project guidelines exclude the use of exceptions, languages may define a way to optionally suppress such checking for regions of the code or for the entire program. Analogously, compiler options may be used to achieve this effect.

Cross reference

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Mechanism of Failure

~~The vulnerabilities that should have been prevented by the checks re-emerge whenever the suppressed checks would have failed. For their description, see the respective subsections. Vulnerabilities that could have been prevented by the run-time checks are undetected, resulting in memory corruption, propagation of incorrect values or unintended execution paths.~~

Applicable language characteristics

**Comment [JWM1]:** Mention that some languages disable the checking by default.

45 This vulnerability description is intended to be applicable to languages with the following  
46 characteristics:

- 47
- 48 • Languages that define runtime checks to prevent certain vulnerabilities and
- 49
- 50 • Languages that allow the above checks to be suppressed,
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- 52 • Languages or compilers that suppress checking by default, or
- 53 —
- 54 • Languages, whose compilers or interpreters provide options to omit the above checks
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57 Avoiding the vulnerability

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59 Software developers can avoid the vulnerability or mitigate its ill effects in the following  
60 ways:

- 61
- 62 • Do not suppress checks or restrict such suppression to the most performance-critical  
63 sections of the code. Do not suppress checks at all or restrict the suppression of checks  
64 to regions of the code that have been proved to be performance-critical.
- 65
- 66 • If the default behaviour of the compiler or the language is to suppress checks, then  
67 enable them.
- 68
- 69 • Where checks are suppressed, verify that the suppressed checks could not have failed.
- 70
- 71 • Clearly identify code sections where checks are suppressed.
- 72
- 73 • Do not assume that checks in code verified to satisfy all checks could not fail
- 74 nevertheless due to hardware faults.
- 75

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## 78 Provision of Inherently Unsafe Operations (SUK)

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80 Description of application vulnerability

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82 Languages define semantic rules to be obeyed by legal programs. Compilers enforce these  
83 rules and reject violating programs.

84  
85 A canonical example are the rules of type checking, intended among other reasons to prevent  
86 semantically incorrect assignments, such as characters to pointers, meter to feet, euro to  
87 dollar, real numbers to booleans, or complex numbers to two-dimensional coordinates.

88  
89 Yet, occasionally there arises a need to step outside the rules of the type model to achieve  
90 needed functionality. A typical ~~such~~ situation is the casting of memory as part of the  
91 implementation of a heap allocator to the type of object for which the memory is allocated. A  
92 type-safe assignment is impossible for this functionality. Thus, a capability for unchecked

93 “type casting” between arbitrary types to interpret the bits in a different fashion is a necessary  
94 but inherently unsafe operation, without which the type-safe allocator cannot be programmed.

95  
96 Another example is the provision of operations known to be inherently unsafe, such as the  
97 deallocation of heap memory without prevention of dangling references.

98  
99 A third example is any interfacing with another language, since the checks ensuring type-  
100 safeness rarely extend across language boundaries.

101  
102 These inherently unsafe operations constitute a vulnerability, since they can (and will) be used  
103 by programmers in situations where their use is neither necessary nor appropriate. As the  
104 knowledge of the programmer about implementation details may be incomplete or incorrect,  
105 unintended execution semantics may result.

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107 The vulnerability is eminently exploitable to violate program security.

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110 Cross reference

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114 Mechanism of Failure

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116 ~~The use of inherently unsafe operations or the suppression of checks of the use of~~  
117 ~~inherently unsafe operations~~ circumvents the ~~checks-features~~ that are normally applied to  
118 ensure safe execution. Control flow, data values, and memory accesses can be corrupted as a  
119 consequence. See the respective vulnerabilities resulting from such corruption.

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122 Applicable language characteristics

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124 This vulnerability description is intended to be applicable to languages with the following  
125 characteristics:

- 126
- 127 • Languages that allow compile-time checks for the prevention of vulnerabilities to be  
128 suppressed by compiler or interpreter options or by language constructs, or
  - 129
  - 130 • Languages that provide inherently unsafe operations

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133 Avoiding the vulnerability

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135 Software developers can avoid the vulnerability or mitigate its ill effects in the following  
136 ways:

- 137
- 138 • Restrict the suppression of compile-time checks to where the suppression is  
139 functionally essential.
  - 140
  - 141 • Use inherently unsafe operations only when they are functionally essential.
- 142

- 143 | • Clearly identify program code that suppresses checks or uses unsafe operations. This  
144 | permits the focusing of review effort to examine whether the function could be  
145 | performed in a safer manner.  
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